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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
— 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 — 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. Case No. 950654-CA 
KENNETH FOX 
Defendant/Appellant. 
— 0 0 0 0 O 0 0 0 0 — 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over appeals from Circuit Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §78-2a-3(d)(1990). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The applicable statute to this appeal is Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1953, as 
amended), and is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Has defendant waived his claim that the state failed to establish 
reasonable suspicion for stopping him because the officer did not testify at the hearing? 
2. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion on the basis that the 
informant was reliable and provided the police with reasonable suspicion to justify 
stopping defendant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A trial courts factual finding for a motion to suppress should not be upset on 
appeal unless clearly erroneous. State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 539 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). Factual findings are not clearly erroneous unless they "are against the clear 
weight of evidence, or [unless] the appellate curt otherwise reaches a definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. Rulings on issues of law are reviewed 
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under a "correction of error" standard. City of Monticello v, Christensen, 788 P.2d 
518 (Utah) cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 120 (1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of alcohol on January 7, 
1995. He later filed a motion to suppress the evidence of his intoxication on the basis 
that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. 
An evidentiary hearing on the motion was held on May 23, 1995, before the 
Honorable Cornaby. After hearing the evidence and arguments of counsel, the court 
denied the motion, holding that, under the totality of the circumstances, the informant 
was reliable and provided the officer with enough information to create reasonable 
suspicion to justify stopping defendant. 
Defendant was later convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol after a 
bench trial before the Honorable Michael K. Burton on September 12, 1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The last thing George Cassity wanted to happen after a long, hard day at work 
was to run into his ex-wife's boyfriend, the defendant, at midnight on January 6, 1995 
(Trial Transcript at 12 (hereinafter "T"). But there are some things in life you cannot 
control. After Mr. Cassity and his wife parked their car to have dinner at the New 
Yorker Restaurant, they saw defendant walking arm in arm with a women as they left 
the restaurant (T. 13). Mr. Cassity could also see that defendant was having difficulty 
walking to his car parked along Market Street (T. 28). 
After getting into his eggshell colored 1990 Nissan 300ZX, defendant raced 
away with his female companion, driving down the middle of the road (T. 15-16). 
Curious as to what defendant was doing with another women, Mr. Cassity decided to 
follow (T. 17). Defendant quickly turned south on West Temple and raced through the 
500 South intersection, going 40 miles an hour. (T. 17). When he got to 600 South, a 
one way street for eastbound traffic, defendant turned west into four lanes of oncoming 
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traffic (T. 18). As he made this dangerous turn, defendant roared around the corner at 
a high speed and had to swerve into the Embassy Suites Hotel to avoid a head-on 
collision (T. 18). Upon seeing this, Mr. Cassity screamed: "we've got a head-on 
collision here." (T. 18). Within a minute or two, defendant shot out of the hotel 
underground parking lot and headed south again on West Temple, this time at 60 miles 
an hour. (T. 19). At this point, Mr. Cassity's blood was boiling and knew defendant was 
a serious danger to himself and others. (T. 18). He continued to follow and called 911, 
but could not find any help (T. 20). Mr. Cassity had great difficulty keeping up because 
of defendant's excessive speed, and lost defendant at times (T. 19). 
But Mr. Cassity was able to catch up after defendant stopped at a country bar at 
3900 South and Main Street to drop off his female companion (T. 20-21). Defendant 
then left the bar going south at 50 to 60 miles an hour (T. 21). Feeling he had had 
enough and wanted to go eat, Mr. Cassity decided not to continue to follow the 
defendant (T. 22). But as luck would have it, Mr. Cassity's wife spotted two Salt Lake 
City police officers parked nearby (T. 22, 29). 
In an effort to fulfill his civic duty, Mr. Cassity stopped and told the officers about 
defendant's dangerous driving and his obvious impairment (T. 22, 27-28). He gave the 
officers a description of defendant's car and his direction of travel (T. 31). Without a 
moment to spare, Officer Schow "took off' after defendant (T. 28). While Mr. Cassity 
did not give the police his correct name or address, he did give his correct mobile 
telephone number (T. 22-23). Mr. Cassity was fearful that if defendant knew who had 
reported him to the police, defendant would retaliate against him and his children, who 
lived with their mother (T. 25-26). 
Shortly after speaking with Mr. Cassity, Officer Schow found and pulled 
defendant over at 4500 South and 350 West (T. 34-35). The officer then called the 
Utah Highway Patrol and requested a trooper to come and investigate the defendant for 
driving under the influence of alcohol (T. 34). 
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Trooper McMorris responded and met the defendant and the two Salt Lake City 
police officers, one of which was Officer Schow (T. 36). The trooper subsequently 
arrested defendant for driving while intoxicated. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant has failed to preserve the issue of whether Officer Schow was 
required to testify at the motion hearing for the state to establish reasonable suspicion 
for the stop. He agreed prior to the hearing that the officer need not testify and failed to 
raise the issue during argument. Thus, this court should refuse to consider this issue 
on appeal. 
Even if defendant preserved this issue for appeal, the trial court properly denied 
defendant's motion to suppress. The state successfully established reasonable 
suspicion for the stop through Mr. Cassity's testimony, which testimony provided the 
objective facts to justify the stop. Officer Schow's testimony was not necessary 
because the stop was based solely upon what Mr. Cassity told him about defendant's 
criminal behavior. 
Furthermore, Officer Schow justifiably relied upon Mr. Cassity's tip as the basis 
for stopping defendant; Mr. Cassity was a sufficiently reliable informant under the 
totality of the circumstances. Therefore, this court should affirm the lower court's denial 
of defendant's motion to suppress. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT HAS WAIVED HIS CLAIM THAT THE STATE FAILED TO 
DEMONSTRATE REASONABLE SUSPICION BECAUSE OFFICER SCHOW 
FAILED TO TESTIFY AT THE SUPPRESSION HEARING. 
Defendant has waived his claim that Officer Schow was required to testify at the 
hearing for the state to establish reasonable suspicion for two reasons. First, defendant 
agreed that the officer's presence was not required. Second, he failed to raise the 
issue during argument on the motion. 
A. Defendant Agreed Officer Schow's Presence at the Hearing was 
Unnecessary. 
It is black-letter law that if a defendant expressly withdraws or abandons an 
objection to an issue at the trial court level, he has waived that issue and is precluded 
from raising it on appeal. State v. Castro, 788 P.2d 1216, reconsideration denied, 
review denied, (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Shelton v. State, 546 P.2d 1348 (Okl. Crim. App. 
1976); People v. Calliham, 185 P.2d 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1947). 
At the beginning of the hearing, the state, because the officer had failed to 
appear, raised the issue of whether defendant would claim Officer Schow's testimony 
was required to show reasonable suspicion (T. 3-5). After a brief colloquy among the 
court, prosecutor and defense counsel, defendant agreed to proceed without the officer 
(T. 5-7). 
Because defendant openly agreed on the record that Officer Schow's presence 
was not needed for the hearing, he has waived the claim that the trial erred in finding 
reasonable suspicion for stopping defendant without the officer's testimony. Any other 
result would reward defendant for misleading the state and unfairly prejudice the state 
because it is now precluded from calling Officer Schow to remedy the deficiency the 
defendant now claims - but the defendant knows this. If anyone should be penalized 
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at this stage, it would be the defendant. While he might now be unhappy with his 
decision to proceed without the officer, it is not a basis for an appeal. 
B. Defendant also Failed to Raise the Issue of the Officer's Presence During 
Argument. 
Not only did defendant agree Officer Schow's testimony was not required - he 
also failed to raise the issue in his argument. The law is clear that if an appellant fails 
to properly preserve an issue for appeal, he has waived that issue. State v. Brown, 
865 P.2d 358, 359 N. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The burden rests on the party raising the 
issue on appeal to take those steps necessary to preserve the issue of appellate review 
and determination. Id, Broberg v. Hess, 782 P. 2d 198, 210 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Appellate courts will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal. Ong Int'l 
(U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp., 850 P. 2d 447, 455 (Utah 1993). Arguments not 
raised at the trial level cannot be offered for the first time on appeal. People v. 
Gordon, 792 P.2d 251 (Cal. 1990); Whittingham v. Bray, 613 P.2d 633 (Colo. 1980). 
After agreeing to go forward with the hearing, defendant stated that he may raise 
the issue of Officer Schow's absence later in the hearing (T. 5). However, at no time 
did defendant raise the issue again. He never argued that the state had failed to 
establish reasonable suspicion because the officer had failed to testify. In fact, his 
argument focused entirely upon whether Mr. Cassity was a reliable informant. 
The truth of the matter is that defendant did not have a problem with Officer 
Schow's absence from the hearing; he has a problem with the court disagreeing with 
his claim about Mr. Cassity's reliability. Defendant thought that the officer's absence 
would work to his benefit, but that strategy backfired. A failed trial strategy is not a 
proper basis for appeal. 
Because defendant failed to argue this issue, he failed to properly preserve it; 
therefore, he has waived it. 
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II. TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
EVIDENCE OF HIS INTOXICATION. 
In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the trial court ruled properly. Mr. 
Cassity not only provided Officer Schow with objective facts creating reasonable 
suspicion defendant was committing a crime, but he also was a sufficiently reliable 
informant under the totality of the circumstances. 
A. Reasonable Suspicion that Defendant was Committing a Crime was 
Based upon Objective Facts. 
In Utah, a level two stop requires a "reasonable articulate suspicion" that 
defendant has committed or is about to commit a crime. Men/re, 787 P.2d at 541. In 
order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry, it must be determined if, from the facts 
apparent to the officer and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that officer 
would reasonably suspect that defendant was driving while intoxicated. State v. Baird, 
7638 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). This suspicion must be based on 
"'objective facts' that the individual is involved in criminal activity.'" State v. Holmes, 
744 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(quoting State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718, 
719 (Utah 1985)). "Whether there are objective facts to justify such a stop depends on 
the 'totality of the circumstances."' Id. (quoting State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 183 
(Utah 1987)). 
In this case, Mr. Cassity testified that he told Officer Schow everything that 
happened, including the fact that he had followed defendant from the New Yorker to 
3900 South and Main; defendant went the wrong way on a one-way street and had 
swerved into Embassy Suites to avoid a head-on accident; defendant raced down West 
Temple at excessive speeds; and defendant was obviously impaired (T. 22, 27-28). He 
also gave the officers the defendant's name and a description of his car (T. 31). 
Shortly after speaking with Mr. Cassity, the officer stopped defendant at 4500 
South and 350 West - about eight blocks from where Mr. Cassity last saw defendant. 
The officer then called Highway Patrol to investigate defendant for drunken driving. 
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Based upon this detailed description of defendant's driving pattern, a driving 
pattern indicative of a drunk driver, the officer's stop of defendant was based upon 
objective facts that would have lead a reasonable and prudent police officer to believe 
that defendant was committing a crime. Therefore, the stop was proper. 
Assuming the defendant has preserved the issue that the state failed to establish 
reasonable suspicion because Officer Schow failed to testify, such testimony was not 
necessary. It was Mr. Cassity, the informant, who provided the trial court with the 
objective facts to sustain the stop. The test is what a reasonable and prudent officer 
would have done under similar circumstances. Mr. Cassity's testimony answered that 
question because he, and only he, witnessed defendant's criminal behavior, not the 
officer. What Officer Schow knew about defendant came directly from Mr. Cassity. 
Defendant's argument would have merit if the state had relied at the hearing upon facts 
Officer Schow had developed from his own observations of defendant to justify the 
stop. However, the state made no such claim. 
Furthermore, defendant has cited no authority to support his claim that a witness 
like Mr. Cassity cannot exclusively provide the evidence at a suppression hearing to 
establish reasonable cause under circumstances similar to this case, particularly when 
the standard is an objective, not subjective test. 
The fact that the officer's testimony was not necessary is bolstered by the 
undisputed sequence of events that occurred in this case as established at the hearing. 
Mr. Cassity observed defendant's erratic driving, he told the police about it and they 
stopped the defendant. All of this happened within a short distance and short period of 
time. Based upon this uninterrupted chain of events, the only logical inference that can 
be reached is that Officer Schow stopped defendant only because of what Mr. Cassity 
told him about defendant's crime. The officer's testimony would have simply mirrored 
Mr. Cassity's. Moreover, why was Officer Schow's testimony needed when all the 
parties agreed that he stopped defendant because of what Mr. Cassity told him? 
8 
B. George Cassity was a Reliable Informant upon Which an 
Officer Could Properly Rely Under the Totality of the Circumstances. 
The law is well settled that reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop may be 
based upon an informant's tip provided it is sufficiently reliable. Alabama v. White, 110 
S.Ct. 2412 (1990); Adams v. Williams, 92 S.Ct. 1921 (1972). Whether an informant's 
tip is sufficiently reliable is analyzed under a "totality of the circumstances" test, where 
the informant's veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge are highly relevant. Illinois 
v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 
One of those circumstances depends upon the extent of the police intrusion. As 
the Court in White stated: 
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than 
probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable 
suspicion can be established with information that is different 
in quantity or content than that required to establish probable 
cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can 
arise from information that is less reliable than that required to 
show probable cause, (emphasis added). 
110 S.Ct. at 2416. 
Another circumstance is the nature of the crime reported. As one prominent 
commentator has stated: 
It must be recognized that stopping for investigation are not 
all of one kind and that in some instances the need for 
immediate action may be so great that substantial doubts 
about the reliability of the informant or his information cannot 
be permitted to stand in the way of prompt police action. 
4 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 
9.4(h), at 229 (3d ed. 1996). 
The most recent Utah case to speak about the circumstances under which an 
informant is deemed reliable is State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In 
this case, defendant had accompanied a female friend to the emergency room at the 
University Hospital. While there, two University Hospital security officers saw the 
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defendant getting vocal with an emergency room clerk. The officers also observed that 
the defendant's eyes were glazed, his speech was slurred, he smelled strongly of 
alcohol and was having trouble standing. They concluded that defendant was 
intoxicated. 
When the officers asked the defendant to leave, he responded that he was going 
to get a cup of coffee and then go home. Concerned that the defendant may attempt to 
drive, one of the officers asked defendant's female friend as to where defendant's car 
was parked. The officer then went to the hospital entrance where he saw defendant 
trying to drive away in a red Pontiac Fiero. The defendant repeatedly started the 
vehicle, drove a few feet, stalled and then jerked to a stop. Seeing this, the officer 
asked another hospital security officer to call the University of Utah police dispatch. 
Upon receiving the call, university police dispatched two police officers to investigate 
the report of an intoxicated male, driving a red Pontiac Fiero near the hospital entrance 
and gave the license plate number. 
Arriving at the hospital entrance, one of the officers, spotted a red Fiero with a 
license plate number matching the description given by the dispatcher. The officer 
pulled behind the defendant and observed that he was having a hard time driving and 
he was driving slow and jerky. Based primarily on the dispatch, as well as her own 
observations, the officer stopped the defendant's car. She subsequently arrested 
defendant for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the information from the 
informant was not objectively reliable and therefore did not support the stop. 
The court rejected defendant's argument and found the informant reliable and 
"officer had reasonable suspicion to make the stop premised upon the security office 
tip." Id. at 258. The court reached this conclusion because it found that the hospital 
security office identified itself when it called, making it possible for the police to verify 
the facts underlying the reports; the primary purpose of the security officers was to 
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protect its employees, patients and the general public; and the security officers 
gathered the information in the course of their duties, which protected against any 
speculative or unreliable reports. 
Another Utah case dealing with the reliability of a tipster is State v. Grovier, 808 
P.2d 133 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). In Grovier, a confidential informant called a police 
officer to tell them that there was methamphetamine in a car. The informant also gave 
the officer the color and make of the car as well as the license plate number. The 
officer relayed this information to his supervisor, who located the car, and then had one 
of his other officers stop it. 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress the stop on the basis that the officer did not 
have reasonable suspicion to stop him. The trial court denied the motion, concluding 
that the officer's stop was based upon articulable and substantial facts that defendant 
was committing a felony. The court found the informant reliable because the informant 
was known to the officer; he had previously tipped the officer; he reported that he 
observed methamphetamine in a certain make and color of car and described the 
gender of the two occupants; he identified the license plate number; and he provided 
the location where he had last seen the car. 
On appeal, the court agreed with the trial court's decision, stating: "after 
examining the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court's 
determination of reasonable suspicion was not clearly erroneous." id. at 136. 
While Grovier dealt with known police informants, unidentified citizen informants 
who report their direct observations to police are also reliable. In Dionne v. State, 766 
P.2d 1181 (Alaska 1989), an airport police officer was patrolling the parking lot of an 
airport when a citizen informed her that the driver of a Ford station wagon, which was 
located approximately ten feet away, was "possibly intoxicated." The informant 
indicated that he had reached this conclusion after observing the driver for "some time 
now." When the officer approached the driver, she noticed that the headlights were not 
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on. While speaking to the driver, the driver's speech was slow and slurred. The driver 
was subsequently arrested for driving while intoxicated. 
The court concluded that the citizen informant was sufficiently credible because 
the informant personally observed the defendant for "some time" immediately prior to 
contacting the officer; and it was unlikely that the informant fabricated the statement, 
information was stale or suspect no longer dangerous. Id. at 1183. 
Likewise, the court in State v. Vannes, 781 P.2d 391 (Or. Ct. App. 1989), found 
a citizen informant's tip sufficiently reliable to justify an officer's investigatory stop of an 
intoxicated driver. In this case, a motorist approached an officer and told him that he 
had just stopped the driver of a red Ford station wagon who had been driving 
recklessly. The citizen told the officer that the driver appeared intoxicated and had 
agreed to let the citizen drive him home, but that the citizen had to take his family home 
first. The citizen asked the officer to watch the driver, who was parked right around the 
corner to ensure that he stayed put. The officer did not obtain the name of the citizen 
or the license plate number. 
Minutes later, the officer saw the red Ford pulling out of the parking lot and 
proceed toward the highway. He did not see any erratic driving, but immediately pulled 
the driver over. The officer subsequently arrested the defendant for driving under the 
influence. 
In rejecting defendant's claim that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the 
evidence of intoxication, the reviewing court concluded that the officer was justified in 
relying upon citizen's tip for three reasons. First, the citizen had had personal contact 
with the driver which allowed him to make first hand observations about the driver's 
condition and to confirm the driver's intoxication. Second, the citizen was not seeking 
an arrest. Third, the officer's was able to confirm through his own observations what 
the citizen had reported to the extent that, when he drove around the corner, he saw 
the red Ford leaving the parking lot. The court reasoned that the officer could 
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reasonably have inferred that the citizen was simply a concerned witness who wanted 
defendant to get home safely, and "that kind of informant was worthy of belief." Id. at 
392. 
Numerous other courts have reached the same conclusion about citizen 
informants reporting criminal activity directly to the police. United States v. Sierra-
Hernandez, 581 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1978)(information from an unidentified citizen who 
confronts officer to report that a designated individual present on the scene is 
committing a specific crime is reliable); State v. Adams, 484 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 
1973)(informant deemed reliable because he was average citizen making observations 
during work at gas station and stated he directly observed the facts); Johnson v. State, 
439 A.2d 607 (Md. App. 1982)(unidentified ordinary citizen deemed reliable when 
reporting direct observations); State v. Abadie, 390 So.2d 517 (La. 1980)(informer 
reliable because he was an ordinary citizen who reported direct observations); People 
v. Tooks, 271 N.W.2d 503 (Mich. 1978)(concern citizens entitled to finding of reliability 
when they personally observe suspicious activities, information is sufficiently detailed 
and corroborated within reasonable period of time by police). 
Despite the overwhelming weight of authority supporting the trial court's finding 
that Mr. Cassity was reliable, defendant argues that Mr. Cassity was an unreliable 
informant and relies upon a single case: State v. Black, 721 P.2d 842 (Or. Ct. App. 
1986). However, Black is inopposite to this case. First, and the most obvious 
difference, is that this case does not involve an anonymous telephone call. Mr. Cassity 
personally contacted Officer Schow on the street while trying to follow defendant. By 
personally coming forward, Mr. Cassity made it possible for the police to verify his story 
and exposed himself to possible criminal prosecution if his report was false. The caller 
in Black did not do this. 
Furthermore, Mr. Cassity personally observed defendant's criminal behavior for 
some time before finding the police. In Black, it was not clear how the caller received 
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her information. In the instant case, there was no question: Mr. Cassity observed the 
defendant for miles. 
Moreover, Mr. Cassity gave the officer a wealth of information when compared to 
the tipster in Black. Mr. Cassity told the officer he had observed defendant for some 
time speeding and observed him go the wrong way on a one-way street almost causing 
an accident. Mr. Cassity further gave the officer the make and color of the car and the 
name of the defendant as well as the defendant's direction of travel. Officer Schow was 
able to verify Mr. Cassity's information in that he found the defendant's car where Mr. 
Cassity said it would be. 
Defendant further claims that Mr. Cassity was unreliable because he gave a 
false name and address. However, this single fact does not make him unreliable. In 
Tooks, 271 N.W.2d at 506, the court held that when there is an ostensible reason for a 
citizen informant refusing to identify himself, there is no inherent reliability. 
Mr. Cassity testified that he did not want to identify himself because he feared 
defendant might retaliate against him and his children, which was reasonable since 
defendant was living with Mr. Cassity's children. His desire to remain anonymous under 
these circumstances did not make him unreliable. Any claim of unreliability because of 
a false name and address is buttressed by the fact that Mr. Cassity gave a correct 
telephone number. 
Even assuming defendant is correct on this one point, the totality of the other 
circumstances support the fact that Mr. Cassity was a reliable informant. Like Dionne 
and Vannes, this is a case about a crime in progress: a drunk driver who was an 
immediate danger to himself and the public. The officers did not have the academic 
luxury of quizzing Mr. Cassity about his reliability. Prompt police action was required to 
avoid another traffic tragedy. 
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Like Dionne and Vanness, this is also a case about an ordinary citizen coming 
forward to fulfill his civic duty to report in detail his personal observations and why he 
believed defendant was impaired. Mr. Cassity is the type of informant worthy of belief. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the circuit court's denial of defendant's motion to 
suppress. Defendant has waived any claim that the state needed Officer Schow to 
testify to establish the reasonable suspicion for stopping the defendant because he 
agreed at the hearing that the officer was not need and failed to raise this issue during 
his argument. 
Even if defendant has preserve this issue, Officer Schow's testimony was not 
needed. The facts Mr. Cassity relayed to Officer Schow about defendant's behavior 
satisfies the objective fact test to justify a stop. Due to the closeness in time between 
what Mr. Cassity told Officer Schow and the officer stopping defendant, the only 
inference to be drawn is that the officer stopped defendant because of the information 
Mr. Cassity gave him. Based upon Mr. Cassity's personal observations, reasonable 
suspicion existed that defendant was driving impaired. 
Furthermore, Mr. Cassity was a reliable witness under the totality of the 
circumstances. He was simply a concerned citizen reporting a drunk driver. He was 
able to observe defendant for some time and personally contacted Officer Schow to 
obtain his help - exposing himself to criminal sanctions had his tip been false. He 
provided the officer with the details of why he believed defendant was intoxicated -
from his speeding to driving the wrong way on a one-way street. Because defendant 
represented a potential danger to the public, the officers had to act quickly. Thus, 
under the circumstances, the officer was justified in stopping defendant. 
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Based upon the foregoing, the state requests this court to affirm the lower court's 
denial of defendant's motion to suppress. 
DATED this 12th day of August, 1996. 
E. NEAL GUNNARSON 
District Attorney 
CYJi) CASTLE 
Deputy District Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee 
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ADDENDUM A 
76, Chapter 6, Part 8, Library Theft, is not criminally 
or civilly liable where he has reasonable and probable 
cause to believe that the person committed a theft of 
library matenals 1967 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect — Grounds. 
A p&2£& SS&I&T may sii>p BJ>y pBj$t>j> >J> B pxfbhc 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or iS 
attempting to commit a public offense and may de-
mand his name, address and an explanation of his 
actions. i98o 
77-7-16. Authority of peace officer to frisk sus-
pect for dangerous weapon 
Grounds. 
A peace officer who has stopped a person temporar-
lly for questioning may frisk the person for a danger-
ous weapon if he reasonably believes he or any other 
person is in danger i960 
77-7-17. Authority of peace officer to take pos-
session of weapons. 
A peace officer who finds a dangerous weapon pur-
suant to a frisk may take and keep it until the Com-
pletion of the questioning, at which time he shall ei-
ther return it if lawfully possessed, or arrest Such 
person. i^o 
77-7-18. Citation on misdemeanor or infraction 
charge. 
A peace officer, in lieu of taking a person into cus-
tody, any public official of any county or municipality 
charged with the enforcement of the faw, a port-of-
entry agent as defined in Section 27-12-2, and a vol-
unteer authorized to issue a citation under Section 
41-la-414 may issue and deliver a citation requi^ng 
any person subject to arrest or prosecution on a ihiS. 
demeanor or infraction charge to appear at the c^urt 
of the magistrate before whom the person should be 
taken pursuant to law if the person had been ar-
rested. 1994 
77-7-19. Appearance required by citation — Ar-
rest for failure to appear — Transfer of 
cases — Motor vehicle violations 
Disposition of fines and costs. 
(1) Persons receiving misdemeanor citations s^all 
appear before the magistrate designated in the cita-
tion on or before the time and date specified in the 
citation unless the uniform bail schedule adoptee) by 
the Judicial Council or Subsection 77-7-21(1) per^uts 
forfeiture of bail for the offense charged. 
(2) A citation may not require a person to appear 
sooner than five days or later than 14 days following 
its issuance. 
(3) A person who receives a citation and who f^is 
to comply with Section 77-7-21 on or before the t*me 
and date and at the court specified is subject to arrest. 
(4) Except where otherwise provided by law, a cita-
tion or information issued for violations of Title 41 
shall state that the person receiving the citation
 0r 
information shall appear before the magistrate tyho 
has jurisdiction over the offense charged. 
(5) Any justice court judge may, upon the motion
 0f 
either the defense attorney or prosecuting attorney, 
based on a lack of territorial jurisdiction or the qiS-
quahfication of the judge, transfer cases to the near-
est justice court or the nearest circuit court witlun 
the county 
(6) (a) Clerks and other administrative personnel 
serving the district, circuit, juvenile, and justice 
courts shall ensure that all citations for violation 
of Title 41 are filed in a court with jurisdiction 
and venue and shall refuse to receive citatiooi 
that should be filed in another court. 
(b) Fines, fees, costs, and forfeitures impos%£ 
or collected for violations of Title 41, which ar% 
filed contrary to this section shall be paid to the* 
entitled municipality or county by the state! 
county, or municipal treasurer who has receive} 
the fines, fees, costs, or forfeitures from the coujg 
which collected them. 
(c) The accounting and remitting of sums < 
shall be at the close of the fiscal year of the i 
nicipality or county which has received 
fees, costs, or forfeitures as a result of any in 
properly filed citations. 
77-7-20. Service of citation on defendant — ] 
ing in court — Contents of citation 
(1) If a citation is issued pursuant to 
77-7-18, the peace officer or public official shall is 
one copy to the person cited and shall within five c 
file a duplicate copy with the court specified in i 
citation. 
(2) Each copy of the citation issued under auti 
of this chapter shall contain: 
(a) The name of the court before which the j 
son is to appear; 
(b) The name of the person cited; 
(c) A brief description of the offense charge^ 
(d) The date, time and place at which theji 
fense is alleged to have occurred; 
(e) The date on which the citation was 1 
(f) The name of the peace officer or public c 
cial who issued the citation, and the name < 
arresting person if an arrest was made by a ] 
vate party and the citation was issued in lie 
taking the arrested person before a mag 
(g) The time and date on or before and < 
which the person is to appear; 
(h) The address of the court in which the'i 
son is to appear, 
(i) A certification above the signature of B 
officer issuing the citation in substantially jS 
following language: 'T certify that a copy of t^  
citation or information (Summons and 
plaint) was duly served upon the defendant 
cording to law on the above date and I; 
believe and so allege that the above-named dj 
fendant did commit the offense herein set 1 
contrary to law. I further certify that the con 
which the defendant has been directed to ap 
is the proper court pursuant to Section 77-7-5 
and 
(j) A notice containing substantially the J 
lowing language: 
READ CAREFULLY 
This citation is not an information and will not* 
used as an information without your consent, 
information is filed you will be provided a copy by J9] 
court. You MUST appear in court on or before f 
time set in this citation. IF YOU FAIL TO APPE 
AN INFORMATION WILL BE FILED AND 
COURT MAY ISSUE A WARRANT FOR YOURi 
REST. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
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will be delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 230 South 500 East, #300, Salt Lake 
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